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Chapter 1 
AN INTRODUCTION TO FAMILY LAW 
§ 1.01 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In its traditional sense, family law, also called domestic relations law, involves the 
legal relationships between husband and wife and parent and child as a social, 
political, and economic unit. In recent years, the boundaries of family law have 
grown to encompass legal relationships among persons who live together but are 
not married - so-called nontraditional families. The legal aspects of family 
relationships, whether traditional1 or nontraditional,2 necessarily include principles 
of constitutional law, property law, contract law, tort law, civil procedure, statutory 
regulations, equitable remedies, and, of course, marital property and support 
rights. 
Increasingly, the theoretical and practical implications of family law have been 
shifting from moral to economic issues, and accordingly, a general practitioner or 
business lawyer must now understand and master important family law concepts 
and principles, separate and apart from any divorce litigation. For example, the 
validity or invalidity of a marriage has far-reaching sociai, legal, and economic 
implications in wrongful death actions, since most state wrongful death statutes 
limit economic recovery to the legal spouse as statutory beneficiary, rather than the 
de facto spouse.3 Other areas of the law, including intestate succession and probate 
law, workers' compensation awards, social security qenefits, pensions and retire-
ment plans, medical benefits, insul'ance payments,. loss of consortium actions, state 
and federal tax law, and marital property and support rights, are also directly 
affected by the validity or invalidity of a marriage,4 although some of these benefits 
are also being covered through domestic partnership legislation in some states and 
municipalities.5 American family law cul'rently is in a state of flux and transition 
based upon the dynamic interplay of three interrelated factors: (1) state and federal 
legislatures that regulate by statute many important family relationships; (2) courts 
that interpret these statutes or determine equitable remedies in the absence of such 
statutes; and (3) family law practitioners who must ultimately decide what strategic 
alternatives exist in favor of their clients, and who must persuasively plead and 
prove these alternate remedies before the courts, and increasingly before the 
legislatures, based upon the law, facts, and social need in each particular case. 
1 See infra § 1.02[A]. 
2 See infra § 1.02[B]. 
3 See .r;enemlly infiu § 2.05[D]. 
4 See .r;enemlly infm §§ 2.05[D], 2.10[C], 3.01-3.14. 
5 See inftu § 2.02[C]. 
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[A] Legislative Regulation of Family Law 
State legislatures traditionally have regulated important family law 
relationships such as marriage and divorce based upon the state's important nexus 
with the family unit, and based upon the general welfare of its citizens. As the 
United States Supreme Court stated in Maynanl v. Hill: 
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to 
do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other "institution, 
has always been subject to the control of the legislature. That body 
prescribes the age at which the parties may contract to marry, the 
procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obliga-
tions it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both . . . and the acts 
which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.6 
However, since marriage and divorce are fundamental rights subject to consti-
tutional protection, a state cannot arbitrarily prohibit or interfere with the exercise 
of these marital rights without a compelling reason for doing so.7 Additionally, 
although the state legislatures continue to regulate many important family law 
relationships, CongTess in its federal capacity has also entered the field of family 
law regulation, especially in the areas of child custody8 and child support9 
enforcement remedies, and federal domestic violence legislation.10 · 
[B] Judicial Regulation of Family Law 
State cour ts, on the other hand, must interpret and· apply state family law 
statutes to each particular legal controversy, or attempt to find equitable remedies 
in the absence of such statutory remedies. 
Most family law statutes are drafted as general guidelines. Consequently, state 
court judges normally have broad discretion in resoJving many family law disputes, 
including spousal support and the division of marital property on divorce, and in 
child custody litigation. However, the extent of such judicial discretion in family law 
matters has come under increased scrutiny in recent years. For example, family 
court judges, from their equity heritage as triers of both law and fact, traditionally 
6 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). Implicit throughout Maynani is the traditional view that marriage is a 
status relationship involving three patties: Husband, Wife, and the State. See also Simms u Sirnms, 175 
U.S. 162, 167 (1899) ("The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, 
belongs to the laws of the State, and not the laws of the United States."). See genemlly infl'a § 1.03. 
7 See, e.g., Skinner u Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (protecting , the fundamental freedom to 
pt·ocreate ft·om state infringement); Loving v. ViTginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (declaring state statutes 
prohibiting interracial marriages to be unconstitutional); Zablocki u Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) 
(requiring less onerous state enfot·cement means than prohibiting the marriage of a fathet· who had not 
paid child support). See genemlly injiu § 1.05. 
8 See, e.g., The Federal Parental IGclnapping Prevention Act of 1980,28 U.S.C. § 1738A. See generally 
inftu § 11.02LC]. 
9 See, e.g., The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-67. See genemlly 
infiu §§ 3.14[C], 8.06[F]. 
10 See, e.g., The VIolence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322 (1994). See genemlly infiu 
§ 7.08[A]. 
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possess very wide discretion in adjudicating many family law disputes.11 However, 
the American Law Institute's recently proposed Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution1 2 argues that since judicial discretion in family law matters can be 
"inherently limitless," a major theme of the P?'inciples is an effort to improve the 
consistency and predictability of such trial court decisions.13 
Moreover, a particular judge's interpretation of family law issues will be guided 
by the law of the state whose family law governs a particular qase, and the 
underlying law is by no means uniform from state to state. A judge, for example, 
may be bound to apply a particular state's "traditional" family law statutes and 
judicial precedents, a more "modern" approach, or a "centrist" combination of the 
two.14 A family court judge's analysis of the relevant facts and law may also be 
influenced by whether he or she is a judicial "formalist" or a judicial "functionalist." 
Under the theory of legal formalism, also known as legal positivism, correct 
legal decisions are determined by pre-existing legislative and judicial precedents, 
and the court must r each its decision based upon a logical application of the facts to 
these pre-existing r ules. The formalist judge, embracing the principle of judicial 
restraint, must apply the existing law to the particular facts and remain socially 
neutral. Judging under this formalistic theory is thus a matter of logical necessity 
rather than a matter of choice. 15 
Under the countervailing theory of legal functionalism, also referred to as legal 
realism or legal pragmatism, the formalistic view of legal certainty and uniformity 
is viewed as rarely attainable, and perhaps even undesirable, in a changing society. 
Thus, the paramount concern of the legal functionalists is· not logical and legal 
consistency, as the formalists believe, but socially desirable consequences.16 
11 Fm· example, H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 644-45 (2d ed. 1988): 
It is axiomatic that the tr ial comts have wide discretion in <Jetermining the propriety and the 
amount of [spousal support]. The relevant factors are so numerous and their influence so 
incapable of precise evaluation that the tr ial comt's decision in a particular case will be 
affirmed unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion ot· is based upon an erroneous application 
of legal principles . . . . As a result, claims for [spousal support] are won o1· lost in the tr ial 
comts, which have a corresponding heavy responsibility to deal fairly with the spouses in such 
cases .. .. 
This broad judicial discretion also applies to the classification, valuation, and distribution of marital 
property on divorce, see id. at 589-94, and to child custody determinations as well, see id. at 796-97: 
In most states the award of [child] custody is held to be a matter for the discretion of the trial 
coUJt, to be upset on appeal only where an abuse of that discretion is shown . . . Certainly any 
appellate court should be reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of a trial court in cases 
so entirely dependent upon particular facts and the subtle differences to be drawn from those 
facts. ' 
12 See genemlly ALI, Pl'inciples of the Law of Farnily D'issol~ttion: Analysis and Recommendations 
(2000). 
13 /d. at 69-70, 83, 259. 
14 See, e.g., Hobbs & Mulligan, Cent1·ist Judging and 71raditional Family Values, 49 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 345 (1992). 
15 See, e.g., G. Paton & D. Dm·ham, Jm·isp1·udence 3-14 (3d ed. 1972), Weinrib, Legal Fonnalisrn: On 
the Imminent Rationalit:IJ of Law, 97Yale L.J. 949 (1988). See genemlly M. J ol'i, Legal Positivism (1992). 
16 See, e.g., W. Rumble, American Legal Realism (1968); G. Aichele, Legal Realism and 'l\ventieth 
Centul'y American Jmisprudence (1990). 
4 AN INTRODUCTION TO FAMILY LAW CH. l 
Put another way, where legal formalism is logically-based and precedent-
oriented, legal functionalism is sociologically-based and result-oriented to validate 
society's needs and expectations. According to various commentators, the current 
transition in family law theory and practice is based upon the need to make 
American family law more rational and less harsh concerning the reasonable 
expectations of contemporary societyP 
It remains open to debate whether state legislatures should remain preeminent 
in determining current family law needs and goals, as the fm;malists generally 
believe, or whether the judiciary should take a more active role in determining 
current family law goals and remedies, as the functionalists generally believe.18 
For example, in the 2003 case of Goodridge v. Massachusetts Department of Public 
Health19 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in a 4-3 decision that the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts had "failed to identify any constitutionally 
adequate reason for denying civil marriages to same-sex couples" according to the 
Court's definition of what constituted a "civil marriage," and therefore recognized 
the validity of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts. Three dissenting judges in 
Goodridge, however, opined that ''What is at stake in this case is not the unequal 
treatment of individuals or whether individual rights have been impermissibly 
burdened, but the power of the Legislature to effectuate social change without 
interference from the courts." Moreover, disagreement persists as to which family 
law principles should be r etained, and which should be changed to meet the needs 
of contemporary American society. 
These questions are of more than academic importance, since although legal 
functionalism has been the dominant legal theory of American jurisprudence for 
most of the twentieth century,20 legal formalism is far from a dead issue, and seems 
to be enjoying a remarkable resurgence: 
Not since the late 1920s and 1930s has there been such widespread inter est 
in American jw·isprudence. But it is no longer- the [legal functionalists] who 
are challenging established norms. The ·victories at the polls of political 
conservatives like Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan [and George Herbert 
There is yet a third school of American legal theory, the Cl"itical Legal Studies Movement, which 
generally calls for the dismantling of existing political and legal institutions in favor of newly empowered 
forms of social democracy. See, e.g. , White, Jilrom Realism to C1itical Legal Studies, 40 Sw. U. L. Rev. 
819 (1986); Comment, Round and Round the Bmmble Bu.sh: Jillum Legal Realism to C1itical Legal 
Scholanhip, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1669 (1982); Tushnet, C1itical Legal Studies: A Political Histo1y, lOOYale 
L. J. 1515 (1991). 
17 See, e.g., M. Glendon, The New Family and the New Property (1981); M. Glendon, The 
Transformation of Family Law: State, Law, and Family in the United States and Western Em·ope (1990); 
Schneider, The New Step: Definition, Genemlization, and Theo1·y of Arruwican Family Law, 18 U. Mich. 
J .L. Ref. 1039 (1985). 
18 CompaTe Hewitt u Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979) (''We believe that [family law] questions are 
appropr iately within the province of the legislature, and that, if there is to be a change in the law of this 
State on this matter, it is for the legislatm·e and not the courts to bring about that change."), with Jilley 
u Jilrey, 471 A.2d 705 (Md. 1984) ("it is within the power of this com·t to change the common law"). 
19 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). See also inft-a § 2.08[B]. 
20 See genemlly K. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice (1962); Rumble, supm 
note 16; Aichele, supm note 16. 
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Walker Bush and George W. Bush and a Republican-controlled Congress], 
and the corresponding ideological commitments of many recent appoint-
ments to the [state and] federal bench, now threaten the continued 
prominence of a theory of judicial interpretation first articulated and 
advanced by the [legal functionalists]. Impossible only a decade ago, 
"mechanical jurisprudence" has made a remarkable comeback, and a new 
legal formalism may [or may not] triumph as the principal mode of judicial 
interpretation. 21 
5 
Thus, a family law student and practitioner must be aware of both the dichotomy 
between "traditional" and "modern" family law statutes and judicial opinions, and 
how these statutes and opinions will be interpreted by a formalist or a functionalist 
family court judge. 
The role of the federal judiciary in family law matters is discussed later in this 
chapter.22 
[C] The Role of the Family Law Practitioner 
The ultimate client-representation role of the family law practitioner is to argue 
the client's case persuasively before the court. In the court setting, the attorney 
will employ various alternate remedies and legal strategies to advance the client's 
interests. Presentation of the client's position, as well as the analysis that went into 
preparation for court proceedings, will often find the attorney confronting, and 
deciding upon, an amalgam of theories best suited to the client's case. In each case, 
the family law practitioner must determine what "traditionai" family law principles 
ought to be retained or abolished, what "modern" famiJy law trends ought to be 
adopted or rejected, and what ultimate public policy goals are to be achieved 
through these various laws. 
This process of analysis, repeated on behalf of various clients, can ultimately 
lead the practitioner to pronounced views of how tne law should be structured and, 
once structured, how it should be implemented. In a very real sense, then, the 
famiJy law practitioner is in the forefront of any movements for reform of the 
substance and procedm·e of American famiJy law.23 
These interrelated family law problems facing the legislator, the jm·ist, and the 
family law practitioner resist easy solution. For example, to remove some of the 
worst vestiges of long-standing fault-based divorce statutes, most jm·isdictions 
have enacted "no-fault" divorce legislation and marital property distribution 
statutes. These no-fault divorce statutes cm·rently allow divorces to be granted 
21 Aichele, supra note 16, at x. See also Schaier, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509 (1988) (discussing how 
legal formalism still se1-ves a useful function in limiting judicial discretion and judicial activism); Weinrib, 
Legal F01·malism: On the Imminent Rationality of Law, 97 Yale L.J. 949 (1988) (questioning whether 
the Jaw is essentially rational as the formalists believe, or whether law is essentially political as the 
functionalists believe). See generally Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 527-942 
(1999). 
22 See geneml.ly infra §§ 1.04, 1.05. 
23 See, e.g., Monroe Inke1·, Changes in Family Law: A PractitioneT's Pe?"Spective, 33 Fam. L. Q. 515 
(1999); see also Louise Raggio, W01nen Lawyers in Family Law, 33 Fam. L. Q. 501 (1999). 
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without regard to fault if the marriage has become insupportable because of 
discord or irreconcilable differences that destroy the legitimate ends of the 
marriage relationship and prevent any reasonable expectation of reconciliation. 
Modern property distribution statutes likewise focus on establishing a roughly 
equitable "no fault" distribution of marital property based on each party's 
contribution to the marriage. Although these no-fault procedures arguably are 
more efficient, and these marital property distribution guidelines have a ring of 
fairness to them, some commentators have argued that divorced wives and their 
children may actually be more economically disadvantaged under this "modern" 
family law legislation than under a more "traditional" approach.24 Likewise, there 
is still continuing controversy involving what role (if any) marital fault should play 
in a "no fault" divorce regime. 25 Indeed, some commentators have concluded that 
the no-fault divorce revolution in America "has fa:iled."26 
Thus the quest continues to determine which family law principles are obsolete 
and which family law principles are relevant to the changing needs of our 
24 See, e.g., L. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution in America: The Unexpected Social and Economic 
Consequences for Women and Children in America (1985). Although the accuracy of Professor 
Weitzman's statistical studies have been questioned, other studies have conoborated this "feminization 
of pove1ty" resulting from divorce. See also McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster 
of Div01'Ce .{o1· Women and Child?Ym, 21 Fam. L.Q. 351 (1987); K. Winner, Divorced from Justice: The 
Abuse of Women and Children by Divorce Lawyers and Judges (1996). Minor children also suffer from 
divorce: 
'I\vo-thirds of all divorces involve minor children, and according to Columbia law professor 
Martha Fineman, author of The Illusion of Equality, the average annual child support 
payment is only around $3,000. "Equality is being applied with a vengeance against women", 
she says. Ultimately, the average household income fo1· children of divorce drops thirty 
percent, while the poverty rate for children living with single mothers is five times as high as 
for those in intact families. 
Elizabeth Gleick, Hell Hath No Fu?'!f, Time Magazine, Oct. 7, 1996 at 84. See also Scott, Rational 
Decision-Making About Man·iage and Div01'Ce, 76 Va . • L.' Rev. 9, 29 (1990) ("There is substantial 
evidence that the p1·ocess of going through their parents' divorce and resulting changes in their lives are 
psychologically costly for most child•·en"); Judith Wallerstein, The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: A 
Twenty Five Year Landmark Study (2000) (discussing the long-term negative effects of divorce on 
children); Judith Wallerstein & Sandra Blakeslee, Second Chances: Men, Women, and Children a Decade 
After Divorce (1989) (same). 
25 Compa1-e ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations 
(2000), and Ellman, The Place of Fault in Modem Divon;e Law, 28 Ariz. St. L.J. 773 (1996) (arguing for 
the total abolition of all fault-based factors in marital dissolution or divorce), with Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, 
and Dissipati01t: The Discou1·se of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 Geo. L.J. 2525 (1994) (arguing that fault 
factors on divorce still have a legitimate pw·pose to counteract egregious marital fault), and Swisher, 
Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Div01'Ce, 31 Fam. L. Q. 269 (1997) (same). See also Wardle, 
No-Fault Div01r:e and the Div01'Ce Conundntm, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 79; DiFonzo, Beneath the Fault Line: 
The Popular and Legal Cultw·e of Divorce in 'I\ventieth Century America (1997). 
26 See for e.xample, Council on Families in America, Ma1·1iage in Amm·ica; A Rep01i to the Nation 
(1995): 
The divorce revolution- the steady displacement of a marriage cultw·e by a cultm·e of divorce 
and unwed parenthood- has failed. It has created terrible hardships for children, incmTed 
unsupportable social costs, and failed to deliver on its promise of greater adult happiness. The 
time has come to shift the focus of national attention from divorce to maniage and to rebuild 
a family cultw·e based on enduring marital relationships. 
B~tt see Divorce Reform at the Crossroads (Sugarman & Hill ed. 1990) (arguing that se1ious problems 
within a no-fault divorce regime need to be corrected, but without abandoning no-fault divorce pe1· se). 
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contemporary society. But while embarking on this legitimate quest, the legislator, 
jurist, scholar, and family law practitioner ought not be too hasty, in the absence of 
sound empirical evidence, to "throw the baby out with the bath water" in assessing 
and reassessing present and future family law needs and goals. 
§ 1.02 WHAT IS A FAMILY? 
In order to understand the legal relationships existing in a family law context, we 
must first define what a "family" is. Narrowly defined, "family" can mean a group 
related by blood or by marriage, such as a traditional family involving a husband 
and wife or a parent and child. 27 Broadly defined, a "family" may include a 
nontraditional family, meaning one of a group living in the same household.28 
A "family" can also be analyzed under an "organic" model or under an 
"individualistic" model. An organic family model emphasizes the good of the family 
unit at the expense of its individual members, and it is frequently associated with a 
hierarchically-ordered "traditional" family unit. An individualistic family model, on 
the other hand, views the family as composed of discrete and separate individuals, 
who are basically complete apart from the family unit.29 
Regardless of how it has been defined, however, the remarkable resilience of the 
family unit has been primarily related to its role in the raising and socialization of 
children, and in the mutual social and economic support of its members.30 
Arguably, a family is also morally justifiable under a "community" model, where 
the family finds its justification not only in its function of raising children and 
contributing to the economic well-being of its members, but also in the benevolence 
and the psychological satisfactions a family brings. Thus, family law finds its 
ultimate justification in reducing the uncertainties and inequities that are associ-
ated with conjugal relationships without rules, in e~tablishing custody of children, 
in preventing harm to children, in providing economic rights and obligations for 
family members, and in establishing rules that will optimize human happiness 
within a family relationship. 31 
27 See, e.g., Village of Belle Te1·re u Bomas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (holding that a single family dwelling 
for zoning purposes, under a village ordinance, was limited to persons rela~d by blood, adoption, or 
marriage). 
28 See, e.g., Bmschi v. Stahl Associates, 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (for rent control purposes, a family 
included "two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long-term and characterized by an emotional 
and financial commitment and interdependence"); see also Note, Legal Rights of Unmm·ried Hetem-
se:~;ual and Homosexual Couples and the Evolving Definitions of "Farnily," 29 J. Fam. L. 417 (1990-91); 
Chambers & Polikoff, Farnily Law and Gay and Lesbian Family Issues in the Twentieth Centt£1'Y, 33 
Fam. L. Q. 523 (1999); infra notes 51, 69 (and accompanying terl). 
29 See generally L. Houlgate, Family and State: The Philosophy of Family Law (1988). 
30 J. Eekelaal', Family Law and Social Policy 20-23 (2d ed. 1984). 
31 Houlgate, supm note 29, at 49. 
